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Abstract Addressing global fisheries overexploitation
requires better understanding of how small-scale fishing com-
munities in developing countries limit access to fishing
grounds. We analyze the performance of a system based on
individual licenses and a common property-rights regime in
their ability to generate incentives for self-governance and
conservation of fishery resources. Using a qualitative before-
after-control-impact approach, we compare two neighbouring
fishing communities in the Gulf of California, Mexico. Both
were initially governed by the same permit system, are situat-
ed in the same ecosystem, use similar harvesting technology,
and have overharvested similar species. One community
changed to a common property-right regime, enabling the
emergence of access controls and avoiding overexploitation
of benthic resources, while the other community, still relies on
the permit system. We discuss the roles played by power,
institutions, socio-historic, and biophysical factors to develop
access controls.
Keywords Small-scale fisheries . Gulf of California .
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Introduction
The contribution of small-scale fisheries (SSFs) to global
fisheries catch and their role in maintaining human welfare
(i.e., human nutrition, food security, poverty alleviation and
development) has been systematically underestimated in
past global assessments (Jackson et al. 2001:205; Worm et
al. 2009). Increasing evidence suggests that SSFs are marine
common-pool resources of global social, economic, and
ecological significance (Andrew et al. 2007; FAO 2009;
Smith et al. 2010). When including fisheries-associated
livelihoods the number of people sustained by SSFs around
the globe is estimated at 200–250 million people (Berkes et
al. 2001; Delgado et al. 2003), the great majority of whom
reside in developing countries, producing more than half of
the world’s harvests (Berkes et al. 2001; Pauly 2006).
Addressing the global fisheries overexploitation crisis will
require better understanding the conditions that enable fishing
communities in developing countries to craft access control
mechanisms and prevent overfishing. In this paper we com-
pare case studies of two Mexican fishing communities
through an “embedded” institutional analysis approach
(McCay 2002). Both fishing communities have similar fishing
history, share the same ecosystem and have adjacent fishing
grounds, harvest similar species with similar technology, but
have achieved contrasting conservation outcomes. Our study
shows that while both communities were governed under the
same system based on individual licenses (herein permit
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system or permits), neither could effectively control access to
their fisheries, eventually leading to overuse. It was only after
the establishment of a communal property-rights regime in
one of them (also regarded as marine tenure within the text)
that access control was more effective and helped avoid over-
harvesting of its primary benthic resources. However, this
change in access control effectiveness took over a decade to
emerge after the formal establishment of property rights, and
key socio-cultural, historical, ecological, and geographical
aspects in which the communal property is embedded influ-
enced such change.
As Acheson states (2006), understanding under what con-
ditions resource users develop rules to sustain their livelihoods
is a long standing question of interest to commons scholars
(Berkes 1989; Blomquist 1992; Ostrom 2005; Agrawal et al.
2008; Persha et al. 2011). Our study is located in the commu-
nities of Kino Bay (hereafter Kino), and the Seri village of
Punta Chueca (hereafter the Seri) (Fig. 1) in the Gulf of
California (GC), a very important ocean biologically (Brusca
et al. 2005) that comprises 40–50 % of Mexico’s fisheries
(Cisneros-Mata 2010). From a policy perspective, better un-
derstanding how permit or marine tenure regimes perform is
of great importance since fishing permits are the most com-
monly used tool to control access tomarine resources through-
out Mexico (Soberanes Fernández 1994). This can be also of
relevance to other developing countries in Latin America that
rely on similar –license-based- systems for the management of
SSFs (Salas et al. 2007), many of which are de factomanaged
under open-access and close to overuse or already overex-
ploited (Salas et al. 2011).
Next we introduce the theoretical approach and the sour-
ces of information on which this study is based, and prog-
ress chronologically to describe the early evolution of
fisheries governance and performance, the transition to-
wards access controls in the Seri case study and the present
state of fisheries governance and performance. The present-
day description focuses on the exploitation of a benthic
resource (pen shells, Atrina spp. and Pinna rugosa) because
it became of significant importance in the region during this
period and is almost the only one for which some informa-
tion on its condition exists. Finally we discuss how issues of
power, institutional and sociocultural factors, geography,
ecology, and history have shaped each community’s ability
to control access, engage in self-governance, and promote
conservation behaviours. We end up with some brief policy
implications.
Theoretical Approach
We follow a cultural and historical approach in human ecol-
ogy to explore commons-related questions “as ones about
competition and collaboration among social entities; the
embeddedness of individual and social action; and the histor-
ical, political, sociocultural, and ecological specificity of
human-environmental interactions and institutions” (McCay
2002:362).
We examine the role that formal property-rights play in
the emergence of local institutions to control access to
fishing commons. Institutional emergence is conceptualized
as a change from open access—the null condition of no
rules or property claims (McCay 1996)—to a rule structure
or property right regime that assigns roles and responsibil-
ities for what is required, prohibited, or permitted. Under
this view, an institutional change from open access to an
alternative regime involves some form of collective action
to develop, maintain, and enforce agreements by those that
can foresee being benefited by the new institutional struc-
ture (Acheson 2006).
By “assessing performance” we mean comparing the
kinds of incentives that permit and marine tenure policies
create for local fishers’ ability to develop institutions to
control access, and avoid the overexploitation of their fish-
ing commons. We take an “embedded” approach that views









Seri pen shell fishing grounds






Fig. 1 Map of the study area
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institutions as closely interlinked features of the cultural,
cognitive, and ecological realms within which acting and
decision-making is embedded (McCay 2002:362). This ap-
proach brings to the forefront of the analysis the human
dimension of fishing, interweaving the role of “property-
rights”, “culture”, “power”, and “history” in understanding
policy performance for the emergence of access controls
that promote conservation in small-scale fishing settings
(Jentoft 2004).
We find this approach useful to avoid interpretations of
institutional analyses as about finding/designing “the right”
combination of property-right regime, which can become
associated with ideologies that privilege the choice of some
property-rights regimes over others, and problematizes the
assessment of their performance by minimizing attention to
the social, cultural and personal costs of implementation and
other potential alternatives (Mansfield 2004; McCay 2008;
Lowe and Carothers 2008).
In taking an embedded approach to better understanding
how small-scale fishers govern their commons, we aim at
avoiding this shortcoming and also contribute to the literature
on the commons as social-ecological systems (SES) (Ostrom
2009). In our comparative study of two adjacent fishing
communities, exploiting the same resources, using the same
technology and in the same general ecosystem, one of the
communities did not go through a change in property-rights
regime. This provides the opportunity to assess with a coun-
terfactual the effects of the change in property-rights in the
other community. Being able to hold some ecological and
social factors constant to analytically focus on the effect of a
small number of variables in a SES system, has been men-
tioned as an important way forward towards developing a
multi-tiered diagnostic framework for the analysis of particu-
lar SES systems (Ostrom and Cox 2010, Poteete et al. 2010).
Sources of Information
Both fisheries lend themselves to a quasi-experimental set-
ting (Cook and Campbell 1979). Our comparison is inspired
by Mills (1967) notion of “most similar system” and uses a
before-after-control-impact (BACI) design commonly used
in the biological and environmental sciences, but less so in
commons studies. We compared both fisheries’ institutional
ability to control access and avoid overexploitation before
and after a change in formal property-rights that took place
in the Seri community in 1975 (Table 1). Before 1975 the
permit system governed fisheries in both communities. In
1975, the Seri were formally granted communal property-
rights that superimposed with the permit system.
Meanwhile, Kino fishers did not experience any change in
property-rights regime and continued governing their fish-
ery through the permit system until present (Table 1).
To compare governance systems and the state of
fishery resources in both communities before and after
the introduction of formal property-rights in Seri terri-
tory we used primary and secondary—historic (early
1900s–1980s) and recent (1990s–2010)—sources of in-
formation. Historic sources of information included pub-
lications from several authors who reported historical
data from the study region (i.e., Smith 1954; Malkin
1962; Cruz-Acosta 1979; Chenaut 1985; Felger and
Moser 1985; Cisneros-Mata et al. 1995; Bahre et al.
2000; Bowen 2000; Basurto 2006). Recent sources of
information were obtained through research efforts car-
ried out by the authors of this study between 1995 and
2010, some of which have been published elsewhere
(i.e., Bourillón 2002; Basurto 2005, 2008; Basurto and
Coleman 2010; Moreno et al. 2005a, b; Cinti et al.
2010a, b). These studies utilized social sciences meth-
ods, including participant observation, formal interviews
with fishers, fish-buyers and authorities, and analysis of
official statistics and documents like fishing coopera-
tives’ bylaws and legislation, among others. We also
relied on first hand experience of the co-authors who
lived in these communities for extended periods of time
(>10 years) either as their place of origin, to conduct
academic studies and/or professional work.
Early Evolution of Fisheries Governance
and Performance
Kino and the Seri communities have always shared
contiguous fishing areas characterized by sandy shallow
bottoms near the shore and rocky habitats in the west-
ern side of Tiburon Island (Fig. 1). Their commercial
fishing history is closely intertwined even though cul-
turally and ethnically they differ greatly. Most Kino
fishers are mestizo and recent immigrants to the area
(~1920s), while Seri fishers have been native and resi-
dent to the region for thousands of years. The Seri have
a long history of conflicts with Spanish and mestizo
Mexicans who tried to remove them and gain control
of the natural resources in their historic terrestrial and
marine territory (Sheridan 1999). We will later elaborate
on how this antagonism served as a strong motivator to
control access to Seri fishing grounds.
Table 1 Schematic representation of our research design




Kino (“control”) Permit Permit
Seri (“impact”) Permit Permit + Marine Tenure
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Fishing down the Food Web: 1930s to Early 1970s
Between the 1930s and early 1970s, both Kino and Seri
fishing communities were governed by the permit system
and sequentially overfished their food web as characterized
by Pauly et al. (1998) for open access regimes. The first
fisheries law in Mexico (1925) defined permits as its main
management policy for harvesting a number of species
including sharks, sea-turtles, other fin-fish species, bivalves,
lobster, shrimp, among others (Soberanes Fernández
1994:5–6). Historic descriptions suggest that the function-
ing of the permit system was—as it is today—heavily influ-
enced by the relationship between permit holders and
fishers. It is thought that both communities’ fisheries oper-
ated roughly in the same manner because the sameMexican
permit holders (who also acted as fish-buyers) commercial-
ized the catch of both communities’ fishers (Smith 1954;
Cruz-Acosta 1979; Bowen 2000; Bourillón 2002; Basurto
2006).
As permit holders, fish buyers had a powerful influence
on the permanent settlement of fishers, the formation of
fishing cooperatives and fishing towns. In the 1930s Kino
and Seri fishers established their first fishing cooperatives
(Table 2). The “Lázaro Cárdenas” cooperative in Kino
(established in 1935) reached up to 100 members until it
was dismantled in the 1990s due to mismanagement issues.
The Seri cooperative (established in 1938) was organized by
the non-Seri fish buyer Chucho Salazar1, who obtained its
first fishing permits, acted as its manager, and commercial-
ized all its catch.
Fish buyers often competed for Seri labour because they
accepted a lower price for their catch or exchanged it for
other goods (Smith 1954). The Seri also gained from the
relationship because it provided a steady source of income
and access to outside commercialization channels. Malkin
(1962:33) nicely summarizes Seri fisheries governance at
the time:
“[t]he Seris’ commercial fishing is pretty much con-
trolled and exploited by the two or three Mexican fish
traders from Nogales and Hermosillo. These have their
tiendas in El Desemboque, which at set prices sell
things to the villagers. They also provide the Indians
with the five horse-power motors for fishing trips and
pleasure cruises and with the oil and gasoline essential
to run these—also at set price. They finally purchase
the fish—at a set price—and from the proceeds the
Seris purchase goods at the tiendas, completing the
cycle…”
In an effort to gain control of the Seri labour pool and
monopolize all its catch, Solórzano established the
cooperative in what is today the town of El Desemboque.
The cooperative was located more than 50 km north of1 A pseudonym replaced the real name.
Table 2 Historical summary of both communities’ fisheries (1920s–
2000s)
Year Events
1920–1930s • Law establishing the permit system in Mexico.a
• Both communities involved in fishing totoaba
(boomingbc) and sea turtles.d
• First fishing cooperatives established in Kino
(1935) and Seri village (1938).
• Ubiquitous presence of non-Seri fishers living
in Seri villages.e
1940s • Both communities involved in fishing large shark
species (booming fisheryf) and sea turtle fishing
(increased effort).d
• End of 1940s: collapse of large sharks fishery eg,
scarcity of saleable fish in the Gulf of California
due to war-time overexploitation and use of
dynamite in fishing.hi
1950–1960s • Both communities involved in booming of sea
turtle fisheryj and its decline in the 1960sb.
1970s • Both communities involved in diving fisheriesk
including rainbow lipped pearl oysters
(Pteria sterna), rock scallops (Spondylus limbatus),
lion paw scallops (Nodipecten subnodosus), and
pen shells (Atrina spp. and Pinna rugosa).
• Sea turtle fishery overfished (early 1970s)l and
totoaba fishery closed (1974)m.
• Declaration of Seri exclusive fishingn (1975) and
land rights (1978)n.
• Open access fisheries continue inside the Seri
marine tenure.
1980s • The state company PROPEMEX arrives to Seri
territory promoting heavy exploitation of fin fish
species. Outside fishers actively involved in
fishing activities.k
• Diving fishing effort of benthic species diminishes
substantially until PROPEMEX leaves the
Infiernilllo Channel by the end of the decade.k
• Kino fishers start encroaching the Seri marine tenure.fk
• The Seri to start controlling access to their marine
tenure (~1984)fk
1990s • Both communities involved in pen shell fishing.n
• Swimming crab fishery begins.n
• Seri fishing permits expire and are not renewed (1992).f
• Multi-specific fisheries boom in Kino including
triggerfish, rays, jellyfishes, swimming crabs.o
• Kino small shark species fisheries in decline.p
2000s • Pen shell fisheries boom in the Infiernillo Channel.nk
• Kino pen shell, swimming crab, and triggerfish
fisheries in decline or overexploited.
a Soberanes Fernández (1994), b Bahre et al. (2000), c Cisneros-Mata et al.
(1995), d Felger and Moser (1985:45), e Smith (1954), f Seri informants
(Basurto field notes 2009), g Alcalá Moya (1999), h Saenz-Arroyo et
al. (2005b), i Saenz-Arroyo et al. (2005a), j Bowen (2000), k Basurto
(2006), l Seminoff (2010), m Lercari and Chávez (2007), n Bourillón
(2002), o Cisneros-Mata (2010), p Bizzarro et al. (2007)
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Kino, as a way to move the Seri away from other competing
fish buyers. The move effectively created the first sedentary
village of the Seri community and improved Seri fishers’
quality of life. But after Solórzano decided to leave the Seri
in 1948 (Smith 1954), the cooperative declined.
The main marine resources harvested by Kino and Seri
fishers between 1925 and the mid 1970s included sea turtle
(Cheloniidae), shark (Lamnidae, Triakidae, Heterodontidae,
Squatinidae, Carcharhinidae, Sphyrnidae), other large speci-
mens of selected species of the Sciaenidae Family (e.g.,
Totoaba macdonaldi) grouper (Serranidae), snapper
(Lutjanidae), mackerel (Scombridae), jack (Carangidae)
and mullet (Mugilidae), and resources harvested by diving
such as scallops (Pectinidae), pearl oysters (Pteriidae), or
pen shells (Pinnidae) to a lesser extent. Many of these
resources had been sequentially overexploited in the Kino
and Seri areas by the 1970s (See Table 2 for details and
citations).
The Transition Towards Access Controls
Open Access amid a Change in Formal Property Rights:
1970s- mid 1980s
In the 1970s three executive decrees granted the Seri formal
rights to a portion of their historic coastal territory in the
form of common land use-rights in the mainland—using the
ejido system of communal land tenure (Diario Oficial de la
Federación 1970)—and Tiburon Island (Diario Oficial de la
Federación 1978), and permanent and exclusive withdrawal
rights of marine resources, i.e., a marine concession to “the
waters surrounding Tiburon Island” (Diario Oficial de la
Federación 1975). Granting Seri property rights over a
portion of their historic range was part of a federal policy
by the National Institute for Indigenous Affairs (INI for its
acronym in Spanish) to prevent the smallest native groups in
Mexico from disappearing through conflict with other
neighbouring and faster growing mestizo settlements.
The marine tenure granted to the Seri in 1975 was terri-
torial in nature, that is, not species-specific like the fishing
concessions granted to cooperatives or individuals else-
where in Mexico, and limited to those individuals belonging
to “the Seri tribe and the Seri fishing cooperative” (Diario
Oficial de la Federación 1975). These changes also forced
the Seri to organize a local government following the struc-
ture required to govern ejido common property, i.e., a “gov-
ernor” or president, a secretary, and a treasurer.
Despite the formal change in property-rights regime in
Seri fishing grounds, all commercialization continued to be
controlled by non-Seri permit holders under the same de
facto open access regime as before, and the sequential
overexploitation of primary resources continued: The sea
turtle fishery started to show signs of overuse and by 1974
the totoaba fishery was formally closed. Diving fisheries
continued to increase their fishing effort until the State
company PROPEMEX arrived to Seri territory, providing
gear and infrastructure for targeting fin fish species and
fishing pressure on diving species diminishes substantially
(Table 2).
Emergence of Incentives to Control Access: Mid
1980s—Present
Around the mid 1980s, large fin fish scarcity led Kino and
Seri fishers to increasingly target species of lower trophic
levels, particularly as new markets emerged for species previ-
ously considered as “trash” [e.g., triggerfish (Balistidae), jelly-
fish (Stomolophidae), sea cucumber (Stichopodidae), etc.,]
(Cisneros-Mata 2010). The economic importance of diving
fisheries increased in Kino and Seri communities, and
scarcity increased Kino fishers’ need to travel further and
use Tiburon Island as a stopover fishing camp during
multi-day trips. The Seri observed such encroachment on
their territory with unease, particularly as outsiders made
explicit their interest to access valuable benthic resources
inside the Infiernillo Channel. Outsiders’ demand for ac-
cess prompted an entrepreneurial Seri leader and governor,
to require monetary payment in exchange of permission to
access Tiburon Island fishing camps and the Infiernillo
Channel. As one informant put it: “it was easy money, it
was crazy to pass up on this opportunity!” Between 1984
and 1987 other rules to grant temporary access and with-
drawal rights to harvest benthic resources inside Seri ter-
ritory were created (Table 3). According to cultural
custom, the income generated by the access fees stipulated
in rules 1 and 2 accrues only to the Seri governor and his
family in lieu of taxes and State or Federal funding.
However, rule 3 stipulates that all non-Seri pen shell
fishers must hire a member of the Seri community as part
of the fishing crew which allows other members of the
Seri community economic compensation from the presence
of outsiders, since under rule 4 the monetary returns from
the catch are shared equally among all crew members.
The presence of members of the Seri community on
outsider boats (usually from Kino) could also help monitor
their compliance with other rules-in-use, rule 5, dictating
that divers must not harvest pen shells in culturally im-
portant areas.
The rules shown in Table 3 are enforced through a variety
of means including shaming or through the Guardia
Tradicional (Seri Traditional Guard), an armed, informal
group of community members whose main task is to police
the Seri marine and terrestrial territory to prevent poaching,
land invasions and ensure collection of access fees (Basurto
2005).
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Present-Day Fisheries Governance and Performance
(with Emphasis on Both Communities’ Pen Shell
Fisheries)
The Setting
Currently small-scale fisheries (SSFs) in the Gulf of
California harvest about 80 target species and employ
about 50,000 fishers with a fleet of about 25,000 out-
board boats (8–9 m long) (Cisneros-Mata 2010:119).
According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y
Geografía (INEGI 2005), the population of Kino stands
at about 5,000 inhabitants, while the Seri indigenous
community numbers about 600 people of whom about
half live in Punta Chueca village. Kino is the closest
(ca. 100 km) coastal town to the rapidly growing city of
Hermosillo, the capital of Sonora, one of Mexico’s
largest states and an important outlet for major national
and international seafood markets. In contrast, the Seri
are still fairly isolated, only accessible by land via a
30 km dirt road from Kino (Fig. 1).
Kino has many more boats than the Seri community. In
2007, roughly 50 of the approximately 200 active boats
in SSFs in Kino commercially harvested pen shells
(Comunidad y Biodiversidad 2007, unpublished report). In
contrast, a 2009–2010 estimate by the Seri community
showed between 30 and 60 active boats of which 10–20
targeted pen shells (Basurto unpublished data) (Table 4).
Kino divers target at least 11 other species throughout the
year (Cinti et al. 2010b). Seri divers however, generally dive
only for pen shells throughout the year. Both pen shell
fisheries employ the same harvesting technology based on
a rudimentary underwater “hookah” breathing apparatus
connected through a long hose to an air compressor
mounted atop the boat.
Geographically, the fishing areas claimed by both groups
of fishers contrast in that those of Kino are located inside a
large—and less controllable—open bay. Kino fishers claim as
their ‘uncontested’ fishing territory the areas between “El
Cholludo” fishing camp and the southern entrance of the
Infiernillo Channel (depths ranging between 5 and 70 m),
and the offshore islands, although fishing permits do not
explicitly recognize these areas, leading to ambiguity and
contestation. In contrast, fishing areas within the narrow and
shallow (5–15 m in depth) Infiernillo Channel are considered
the sole property of Seri fishers, making it easier for the Seri to
observe the entrance and exit of boats (Fig. 1).
Note that some of the same fish buyers (most of them
permit holders) that were active before the emergence of
access control by the Seri, continued conducting business with
Kino and Seri fishers in the 1990s and 2000s (Basurto 2006).
Condition of Kino and Seri Pen Shell Fisheries
Pen shells harvested in both communities’ fishing areas are
usually declared and recorded in official statistics as if
Table 3 Some of the most important Seri rules to grant access to
outside pen shell fishers (modified from Basurto 2005)
# Seri locally designed rules
1 Must make monetary payment.
2 Must direct payment to Seri Government officials.
3 Must hire a Seri as part of the fishing crew.
4 Must pay the Seri fisher the same share as to non-Seri
crew-members.
5 Must not fish in culturally important areas.
6 Must not exceed the current maximum allowable catch
per day (not enforced since 2009).
Table 4 Contemporary bio-
physical and sociocultural char-
acteristics of Kino and Seri
fisheries
Kino Seri
Population size 5,000 ~600
Size of pen shell
fishery (Approx.)
50 boats 10–20 boats
Species harvested
through diving
Pen shells (mainly Atrina tuberculosa),
octopus, groupers and snappers, sea
cucumber, and others.
Pen shells (mainly Atrina tuberculosa
and Pinna rugosa), and some sea
cucumber.
Historical characteristics First settlements in 1920s to fish
commercially.
Presence since pre-historic times.
Cultural homogeneity Low: fishers belong to different ethnic
groups and many have immigrated from
different parts of Mexico
High: fishers belong to the same





Open bay of variable depth. Narrow and shallow Channel next
to the village.
Fishing areas and their
boundaries
Wide fishing areas and diffuse
boundaries.
Contracted fishing areas and clear
boundaries.
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harvested in the same location since fish buyers (many of
whom are also permit holders) have been historically the
same. Thus it is impossible to trace the amount harvested by
one or other community. Instead, we used (1) proxy data
based on information gathered through formal interviews
with fishers about historical catches and published historical
accounts, (2) information gathered through underwater sur-
veys in Kino and Seri waters to estimate pen shell densities,
and (3) unofficial pen shell catch data collected through
efforts by the NGO Comunidad y Biodiversidad, the Seri
community, the PANGAS Project, and Duke University.
Catch patterns between Kino and Seri differ, according to
findings from interviews. Kino fishers state that pen shell
catches decreased between 1992 and 1998, while Seri fish-
ers state that catches have remained relatively constant
during that period. Fishers from both communities consis-
tently indicate that Seri pen shell fishing grounds are more
abundant and “generally doing much better than any other in
the region” (Basurto 2005). These reports are supported by
an experienced pen shell buyer who conducted business in
both communities from the 1970s to 2007, who reported
that two thirds of the catch usually came from Seri fishing
grounds.
Field findings of underwater surveys and fisher logbooks
also support this observation. In 2004 Moreno et al. (2005a)
found densities of less than five individuals per 300 m2 in
most of the Kino fishing grounds. In 2001 Basurto found an
average of 64 individuals per 300 m2 at five different Seri
fishing grounds (Basurto unpublished).
Data from a voluntary logbook program (The PANGAS
Project, http://pangas.arizona.edu) reported by Cinti et al.
(2010a) indicate lower average annual catch per unit effort
(CPUE) for the 2007 pen shell fishing season in an impor-
tant fishing ground for Kino’s divers (1.1 kg of adductor
muscle/hour diving) compared with fishing grounds inside
the Infiernillo Channel (2 kg of adductor muscle/hour div-
ing, where Basurto and Coleman (2010) reported 5.9 Kg of
adductor muscle/hour diving for 2009 (average from 12
fishing trips).
Finally, the tendency by Kino fishers to diversify their
catches throughout the year despite the elevated price that
pen shells command year round, might also constitute a
proxy of the scarcity of pen shells in their fishing grounds
in recent years. Although pen shells are one of the few
resources with year-round national demand at a constantly
high market price, Kino fishers tend to diversity their
catches throughout the year and conduct their pen shell
fishery between December and March (Moreno et al.
2005a). As the water warms up in the late spring many
Kino pen shell fishers switch to harvest octopus as they find
it more profitable than pen shells.
Overall, available evidence suggests that Seri pen shells
fishing grounds are in better shape than those of Kino. Next
we provide a description of the institutional arrangements in
place in these communities, to help us understand why they
have reached contrasting conservation outcomes.
Comparative Institutional Arrangements
General Framework to Govern Fisheries in Mexico
The 1925 fisheries law determined the duration of fishing
seasons, delineation of fishing areas, and fishing gear spec-
ifications to be regulated through fishing permits (Soberanes
Fernández 1994). Nowadays permits are issued by the
National Commission of Fisheries and Aquaculture
(CONAPESCA), which is the primary agency in charge of
fisheries regulation and enforcement at a national level. It
works through state offices of SAGARPA (the Ministry of
Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, Food and Rural
Development) to coordinate administration, management
and enforcement at a regional level.
Fishing permits can be granted to any corporate entity
(typically a cooperative) or individual, for periods of 1 to
5 years, although some must be renewed annually. The core
requirements to access fishing permits include (a) presenting
personal documentation, (b) specifying the species, fishing
area, landing port, and duration of the right being solicited,
(c) specifying and certifying technical information about
boat(s), motor(s) and fishing gear(s) as registered in the
Secretariat of Communication and Transportation (SCT),
(d) certifying the legal possession of boat(s), motor(s) and
fishing gear(s), (e) certifying the legal constitution and
membership of corporate entities, (f) certifying registration
at the Federal Taxpayers’ Registry (Ministry of Economy),
and (g) paying the required fees, which in 2008 were about
US$50 (“Ley Federal de Derechos”, Art 191A, inciso IIa),
but the actual cost of the permit varies according to the
target species and is usually much higher.
There is no specified limit on the number of permits a
cooperative or individual may hold. Permit holders must use
only the fishing equipment (boat, motor, and fishing gear)
registered in their permits, and are only allowed to commer-
cialize the products caught using the fishing equipment
registered in their permits. Only permit holders can legally
land the catch and report it at CONAPESCA. The landing
document, aviso de arribo, must accompany the fiscal doc-
ument to sell the catch in the market. Similarly, only permit
holders can provide invoices for the catch, which constitute
proof of legal ownership of the harvest. Invoices are neces-
sary to sell, buy, or transport the catch to regional or inter-
national markets.
Specific regulations for resource use are defined by
Official Mexican Norms published in the Federal Registry.
Seasonal closures (temporary or permanent) and gear or
size restrictions are the most common regulations affecting
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the diving harvest with the one exception of abalone
(Haliotis spp., Haliotidae) fisheries in Baja California
(Cinti et al. 2010a). In addition the National Fisheries
Inst i tute (INAPESCA), as the scient if ic arm of
CONAPESCA, develops the National Fisheries Chart which
summarizes the status, management recommendations, and
indicators for all Mexican fishery resources. These recom-
mendations became legally binding under the new October
2007 fisheries law, “Ley General de Pesca y Acuacultura
Sustentables”. Unfortunately, for most species targeted by
divers in the study area there are no specific Official
Mexican Norms or official information about their popula-
tion status (Cinti et al. 2010a).
Rules-In-Use in the Kino Diving Fisheries
In Kino the permit system tends to exacerbate social
inequalities and discourage responsible fishing practices by
fishery stakeholders (Cinti et al. 2010a). Under federal law,
only permit holders are legally registered and legally able to
participate in any fishery (Cinti et al. 2010a).
Most Kino pen shell divers are pescadores libres or
independent fishers who do not own a fishing permit and
are not members of any cooperatives holding permits (Cinti
et al. 2010a). Consequently they are in effect the labour
force supplying permit holders with catch, and must enter
into an informal working relationship with permit holders in
order to be able to “legally” harvest and commercialize their
catch. However, independent fishers are considered illegal
even if they work under the permits of current permit hold-
ers. Generally, Kino permit holders are the same individuals
who are buyers of the catch, own the necessary equipment
and are familiar with the channels to control the commer-
cialization process. They usually do not participate in fish-
ing activities (Fig. 2).2 However, as legal permit holders
they are the only stakeholders with whom the government
formally communicates key information concerning the
fishery (e.g., regulatory measures, availability of new per-
mits to be allocated), and who have access to government
benefits available to the fishing sector (e.g., fuel discounts,
loans or grants for acquiring new processing technology or
building improved facilities, etc.). Permit holders are also
the only stakeholders participating in local monitoring and
enforcement activities, since they are the only members of
the local committee organized for that purpose. Because of
their preferential access to resources and information, permit
holders are in a privileged position to protect their own
interests and to influence authorities’ decisions regarding
regulatory measures, fishing rights’ allocation, etc. In con-
trast, the fishers, who have the fishing expertise and the
knowledge about the resources they harvest, are literally
marginalized from any formal process concerning their
fisheries.
Such inequitable social structure and the informality of
fisher’s labour are enabled by elements of the permit system
(Cinti et al. 2010a, b) since: (a) actual requirements to access
fishing permits are often too difficult to fulfil by fulltime
fishers (too costly, complicated and bureaucratic); (b) techni-
cally there is no explicit limit to the number of permits an
individual or cooperative could hold, and no explicit limit to
the number of boats each permit holder could register under a
permit. This—in the case of individual permit holders
—generates the need for hiring people to operate several
boats; (c) there is no formal registry of—or social provisions
for—the people working under the permits of existing permit
holders; (d) there are practically no new permits to be issued,
and existing fishing permits—also entailing commercializa-
tion rights—are already concentrated in a few hands. In any
case, the number of permits and boats to be allocated to a
given fishery is subject to the management recommendations
of INAPESCA and the final decision of SAGARPA through
CONAPESCA.
2 Further, most of local corporate permit holders exist only on paper
(Cinti et al. 2010a). Generally, only one person—usually the president
of the cooperative—effectively acts as the corporation, so that in
practice these cooperatives are not cooperatively managed. Also, the
few cooperatives holding fishing permits (for commercial diving prod-
ucts) whose members do participate in fishing usually do not sell their
product through their cooperative, but to other permit holders or
independent buyers with no fishing permit. This means that even in
the few cases where true fishers are holders of fishing permits, they act
in practice as independent fishers. Most independent fishers also de-
pend on permit holders to gain access to fishing equipment and
supplies ( Moreno et al. 2005b; Cinti et al. 2010a). As a result they
are usually in some sort of continuous peonage debt with them and in a
weak bargaining position to negotiate the price they receive for their
catch.
Legal access to fishing
and means of production  
Middle-men=fish buyers
(permit holders and independent buyers) 







Fig. 2 Formal (solid lines) and informal (dotted lines) institutional
arrangements for diving fisheries in Kino
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Ironically, the people who are legally part of the system
have few incentives to follow the rules. Since only permit
holders are allowed to legally commercialize catch extracted
directly from sea, they have high incentives to “launder”
fishing products from illegal sources (e.g., from boats not
registered in their permits) (Cinti et al. 2010a). Often permit
holders will buy from anyone willing to sell, and thus
‘legitimize’ the catch. Once the catch is landed it is nearly
impossible to trace back to the actual fisher who made it.
Some Kino permit holders are also known to bring out-
side boats and fishers to fish locally on condition they sell
them their catch (Cinti et al. 2010a). These acts are a major
source of recurrent internal conflict among fishers, compet-
ing permit holders, authorities, and other community
members. While these permit holders push for increasing
the number of boats to increase their profits, local fishers
generally reject the addition of boats in order to keep local
resources for themselves. Local fishers are willing to accept
fishers from outside the community if these fishers work
with local boats (an informal arrangement) (Cinti et al.
2010a), but are frequently unable to enforce it and prevent
access, leading possibly to conflicts.
The resulting de facto open-access situation is greatly
exacerbated by inefficient official oversight and enforce-
ment despite the presence in town of a local office of the
federal agency in charge of fisheries management.
Rules-In-Use in the Seri Diving Fishery
Since approximately 1984–1987 the Seri have managed
their fisheries based on the de jure autonomy provided by
the multi-species fishing concession formally granted to
them in the mid-1970s in addition to the national permit
system. Formally, the Seri fishing cooperative is bound to
the same rules and regulations as any other fishing cooper-
ative in Mexico, and thus must have fishing permits en-
abling it to legally commercialize the catch. In practice
however, according to a former president, the Seri fishing
cooperative has not updated its fishing permits since 1992.
The fishing cooperative has also historically lacked a func-
tional infrastructure (e.g., ice house, vehicles, etc.) and
commercialization networks. While a number of fishing
cooperatives have emerged within the Seri community in
recent times, as in Kino, they do not seem to be coopera-
tively managed or sell their product through the cooperative.
In general, most Seri fishers depend on external fish buyers
(i.e., permit holders usually from Kino) to take their prod-
ucts to the national market. Recently some Seri villagers
who are no longer active fishers have started operating as
middlemen. Unlike the fish buyers from Kino, these Seri
middlemen are not permit holders and do not own the
fishing means of production or control the commercializa-
tion channels. Having access to transportation resources,
their business is to receive the catch from other Seri fishers
and transport it to Kino fish buyers in exchange for a
nominal fee (Fig. 3).
Even under these limitations, the Seri have managed to
set a relatively effective rule system (even if not free from
internal conflict) to grant temporary access to ‘outsiders’
that helps prevent excessive increases in fishing pressure.
Discussion: An Embedded Performance Assessment
Power, Self-Governance, and Conservation
The permit system in Mexico as implemented in the study
area disproportionately empowers permit holders—who
generally are not fishers—while disempowering and mar-
ginalizing the fishers in such way that neither group has
incentives to coordinate and effectively limit outsider access
to their fisheries. Permit holders act as middle-men in con-
trol of the entire fishing process and behave as roving
bandits (Berkes et al. 2006). They have low dependency
on a specific set of local resources and have the economic
power to “hire” fishers to fish where they are told. Permit
holders and independent buyers are often the reason why
large numbers of outsider boats arrive to fish generating
conflict among local fishermen. Permit holders find no
incentives to encourage local fishers to limit fishing and
these fishers find themselves in a constant race to harvest
local—and other communities’—resources farther away,
before others do the same. Why should Kino fishers pay
the costs involved in self-organizing if they cannot have
reasonable expectations that they will be the recipients of
the benefits generated by their efforts?
Legal access to
fishing and means
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Fig. 3 Formal (solid lines) and informal (dotted lines) institutional
arrangement for the Seri pen shell fishery
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While a new class of middle-men seems to be emerging
among the Seri, it is unlikely that it will lead to the same
power inequalities between fish buyers and fishers as ob-
served in Kino, given that they merely transport the catch
and are not in control of fishing permits or the fishing means
of production. The marine tenure granted to the Seri appears
to have incentivized fishers to—over time—self-organize
and design a complex set of informal rules to control access
and reduce fishing pressure. Given weak monitoring and
enforcement capacity from the government, the Seri
common-property regime has comparatively promoted more
resource conservation (Table 5).
Although Seri fishers are also required under federal law
to operate under the permit system, fisheries authorities do
not enforce it, and thus fishers enjoy the autonomy to
design their own rules to govern the extraction of resources
like pen shells. Such rules-in-use are proving key to gain
and keep in control access to marine resources inside the
Infiernillo Channel, guide fishers’ participation in informal
monitoring and enforcement, and—to a lower but increasing
rate—gain access to fishing means of production and re-
source commercialization.
In both communities, fish buyers play an important role
in the fishing process, particularly as entrepreneurs willing
to absorb most of the inherent risk and uncertainty of highly
volatile and competitive seafood markets. Fishers cannot
effectively play the role of fish buyers and also be active
fishermen in such environments. However, fish buyers, also
need to be held accountable for their actions and for the
most part, the permit system does a poor job at that.
Not by Property-Rights Alone!
The presence of legally established property rights did not
automatically result in the emergence of access controls for
the Seri. It took them about 10 years from when they were
granted marine tenure to the time when they started exercis-
ing access controls to the Infiernillo Channel. During
this period they continued fishing down the food web
(Table 2), until the increasing encroachment of outsiders in
Seri territory reminded them of the long history of domina-
tion attempts by Spaniard and Mexican—a strong incentive
to overcome the costs of engaging in collective action to-
wards the defence of their territory and resources. If history
is a guide, the Seri are not a single cohesive social entity
except when they are confronted with a common enemy. For
the Seri, controlling access to their fishing grounds is also
about defending the biophysical space that provides mean-
ing to who they are as a distinctive social group.
The decadal gap also suggests that the emergence of
effective access controls and the avoidance of overexploita-
tion in the Seri pen shell fishery could not be solely attrib-
uted to the presence of property-rights and socio-historical
factors, but also to particularities of pen shell biology and
biophysical features of Seri fishing grounds. For instance,
the narrowness of the Infiernillo Channel easily allows the
Seri to identify the presence of other boats. Also, the occur-
rence of the most extensive annual eelgrass meadows in the
Eastern Pacific (Torre-Cosío et al. 2003) make it very cum-
bersome to harvest pen shells that inhabit those areas, likely
having positive effects for the recovery of the fishing stock.
Other pen shell-specific biological characteristics (e.g., a
continuous reproductive cycle and a rapid growth and sex-
ual maturation, among others), likely help buffer the poten-
tial negative effects of sudden increases in fishing effort
when monitoring and enforcement is absent or weak inside
the Infiernillo Channel (Basurto 2008; Basurto and Coleman
2010).
But what is the role of formal and exclusive property
rights in helping prevent the overexploitation of pen shells,
amid the relevance of socio-historic and biophysical factors?
Without exclusive property rights the Seri would likely have
Table 5 Summary of resource
condition for the Kino and Seri
fisheries before and after the
emergence of access controls
(with emphasis on the pen
shell fishery)
Fishery Before the emergence of access controls After the emergence of access controls
Kino (“control”) 1. Governance regimen: 1. Governance regimen:
• Permit • Permit
2. Resource conservation: 2. Resource conservation:
• Abundant pen shells • Scarce pen shells.
• Overexploitation of major
fisheries (see Table 2).
• Continued overexploitation of major fisheries.
Seri (“impact”) 1. Governance regimen: 1. Governance regimen:
• Permit • Permit + Marine tenure + Informal Rule
System.
2. Resource conservation: 2. Resource conservation:
• Abundant pen shells. • Abundant pen shells.
• Overexploitation of major
fisheries (see Table 2)
• Potential for other fisheries recovery due to
access control to fishing areas.
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had greater difficulty in finding the incentives to design their
own rule system and maintain it overtime as has been
observed in other settings (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto
2009). Having formal property rights legitimize Seri fishers
as rightful owners, diffusing potential disputes that might
emerge regarding “who” is a legitimate fisher in the eyes of
other local fishers. Fishers from all over the region consis-
tently state that “the Infiernillo Channel belongs to the Seri.”
This recognition creates social structure by setting up the
basis of who is inside the group and who is not, and
therefore facilitates the negotiation of informal access
arrangements between “legitimate owners” and “outsiders”
for the use of Seri fishing grounds by non-Seri fishers. The
Seri’s authority over this territory operates despite the
Mexican Constitution’s stipulation that fishing resources in
territorial waters belong to all Mexican nationals, a tenet
that is commonly used to question small-scale fishers’
territoriality.
Policy Implications
We caution policy-makers to interpret the current perfor-
mance of fishing permits as implemented in the study area
as strong support towards the enactment of marine tenure
systems like the Seri in other settings, unless careful con-
sideration and re-adaptation to local socio-ecological con-
texts is conducted. The Seri marine tenure did not directly
result in the development of access controls until a decade
after its enactment. While having formal property rights
likely served as an enabling factor for locals’ ability to find
enough incentives to develop local institutions our study
shows that the performance of property rights regimes needs
to be tightly coupled in space and time with their social and
ecological context. Performance evaluations will need to be
able to incorporate these dimensions in a systematic fashion
to be more effective and relevant for policy-making. The
performance of the Mexican permit system as implemented
in the study region echoes previous findings suggesting that
to be effective, these policies are highly dependent on ex-
ternal control by authorities (Hilborn et al. 2003). In most
small-scale fisheries in developing countries where usually
large numbers of boats land their catch in multiple sites, and
where institutional capacity for management, monitoring,
and enforcement is often poor (Berkes et al. 2001), the use
of approaches strongly dependent on external enforcement
is unlikely to produce favourable outcomes (Christy 2000),
nor be conducive to the accumulation of needed social
capital for the development of self-reliant rural coastal
communities.
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